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A B S T R A C T   
Although recent studies have shown that electricity systems with shares of wind and solar above 80% can be 
affordable, economists have raised concerns about market integration. Correlated generation from variable 
renewable sources depresses market prices, which can cause wind and solar to cannibalise their own revenues 
and prevent them from covering their costs from the market. This cannibalisation appears to set limits on the 
integration of wind and solar, and thus to contradict studies that show that high shares are cost effective. Here we 
show from theory and with simulation examples how market incentives interact with prices, revenue and costs 
for renewable electricity systems. The decline in average revenue seen in some recent literature is due to an 
implicit policy assumption that technologies are forced into the system, whether it be with subsidies or quotas. 
This decline is mathematically guaranteed regardless of whether the subsidised technology is variable or not. If 
instead the driving policy is a carbon dioxide cap or tax, wind and solar shares can rise without cannibalising 
their own market revenue, even at penetrations of wind and solar above 80%. The strong dependence of market 
value on the policy regime means that market value needs to be used with caution as a measure of market 
integration. Declining market value is not necessarily a sign of integration problems, but rather a result of policy 
choices.   
1. Introduction 
Rising shares of wind and solar in electricity markets around the 
world have led to concerns about their market integration at high pen-
etrations. Several studies have found empirical evidence that electricity 
prices have decreased in markets as the share of variable renewable 
energy (VRE) has risen (Sensfuß, 2007; Sensfuß et al., 2008; Hildmann 
et al., 2015; Figueiredo and da Silva, 2018; Ozdemir et al., 2017; Hirth, 
2018; López Prol et al., 2020; Mills and Wiser, 2015). The cause of the 
lower prices is the very low or zero marginal cost of wind and solar 
generators. This pushes out some of the more expensive generators from 
the market, and, since the price is usually set by the marginal cost of the 
last generator needed to satisfy demand, the prices are depressed during 
times of wind and solar generation. Lower prices lead to lower revenues 
for all generators (the ‘merit order effect’, Sensfuß et al., 2008), but 
especially so for wind and solar generators, since their generation de-
presses prices exactly when they are generating most, an effect known as 
‘cannibalisation’ (López Prol et al., 2020; Mills and Wiser, 2015). Both 
the generally lower prices and the cannibalisation effect have been 
perceived as problematic, because they lead to lower market revenues 
and would lead to less incentive to invest in new capacity in a free 
market (Hildmann et al., 2015; Joskow, 2008). 
These empirical observations (Sensfuß, 2007; Sensfuß et al., 2008; 
Hildmann et al., 2015; Figueiredo and da Silva, 2018; Ozdemir et al., 
2017; Hirth, 2018; López Prol et al., 2020; Mills and Wiser, 2015) were 
made in electricity systems where the existing conventional power 
generation fleet remained largely unchanged, i.e. in the short-term. 
While short-term effects are important, not least because they are 
presently faced by actors on the market, the long-term effects, i.e. the 
situation after the capacity mix has adjusted to an equilibrium state, set 
a limit on the possible role that VRE may play in the power system. For 
this reason, the long-term effects are the focus of this paper. Using 
computer models of the power market where investments in all gener-
ator capacities are optimised, it has been shown that even in a long-term 
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equilibrium there is a decline in revenue for wind and solar with their 
penetration (Mills and Wiser, 2015; Lamont, 2008; Joskow, 2011; Kopp 
et al., 2012; Mills and Wiser, 2013; Hirth, 2013; Gilmore et al., 2015; 
Winkler et al., 2016; Gowrisankaran et al., 2016). The size of the effect 
was estimated to be a decrease in revenues by half at penetration levels 
of 15% for solar and 30% for wind in a selection of European countries 
(Hirth, 2013). The hypothesis put forward in these papers is that it is the 
variability of wind and solar that causes the decline (Lamont, 2008; 
Hirth, 2013; Winkler et al., 2016; Hirth and Radebach, 2016). 
The idea that variability sets a ceiling for the cost-effective pene-
tration level of VRE electricity has been influential. Blazquez (Blazquez 
et al., 2018) claims that ‘The Paradox holds as long as market clear 
prices with short term marginal costs, and renewable technology’s 
marginal cost is close to zero and not dispatchable’, i.e. that energy-only 
markets with variable renewables inherently entail decreasing market 
value with penetration levels. Some have even suggested that the ca-
pacity factor (typically 10–25% for solar and 20–40% for onshore wind) 
should be considered as a limit on penetration (Trembath and Jenkins, 
2015). Hirth and Radebach (Hirth and Radebach, 2016) conclude: 
‘Finally, and more fundamentally, it [the declining MV of VRE with 
penetration level] indicates that variable renewables face a substantial 
difficulty in becoming economical at high market shares. Without 
fundamental technological breakthroughs, a deep decarbonisation of 
power systems will be hard to achieve based on wind and solar power 
alone. Other supplementary low carbon technologies are likely to be 
needed.’ 
In apparent contradiction to the above-mentioned market integra-
tion studies, the last few years have also seen an increasing number of 
cost-minimising energy system studies with high shares (>80%) of 
variable renewables (Brown et al., 2018a; Hansen et al., 2019; Fripp, 
2012; Haller et al., 2012; Budischak et al., 2013; Breyer et al., 2015; 
Bogdanov and Breyer, 2016; Frew et al., 2016; Schlachtberger et al., 
2017; Brown et al., 2018b). The system solutions of these studies 
correspond to long-term equilibria where all generators, including VRE 
technologies, exactly cover their costs with their market revenue (the 
‘zero-profit rule’, Boiteux, 1949; Boiteux, 1960). This appears to 
contradict market value studies that claim that wind and solar revenue 
will be pushed below the cost-recovery level at high penetrations. 
We resolve this contradiction by showing in theory and in model 
simulations how cost, revenue and policy interact. We show that market 
value studies find declining market value by construction because they 
choose to force in VRE with support policies (be it quotas, feed-in tariffs, 
feed-in premiums or capacity incentives). If instead rising carbon diox-
ide (CO2) taxes are used as the primary policy instrument to draw in 
wind and solar, then VRE revenue will always be sufficient to cover 
generation costs. We demonstrate that this holds in a power system 
model even at a penetration of solar and wind above 80%, which is much 
higher than is usually considered in the market value literature. 
While the effects on market prices of subsidies for desirable goods 
versus taxes on undesirable goods is well understood (Pigou, 1920; 
Baumol, 1972), the effects on market values for different technologies in 
long-term electricity market equilibria has not been sufficiently 
considered in the literature. Many market value studies have considered 
the impact of fixed CO2 taxes (Kopp et al., 2012; Mills and Wiser, 2013; 
Hirth, 2013; Gilmore et al., 2015; Winkler et al., 2016; Gowrisankaran 
et al., 2016; Hirth, 2015; Zipp, 2017), but CO2 taxes have only ever been 
a subordinate policy to the main policy of VRE support. The resolution of 
the contradiction requires replacing VRE support with CO2 reduction 
incentives. Although the purpose of a CO2 tax is not explicitly to increase 
VRE generation, but instead to reduce CO2 emissions up to the point 
where the marginal abatement cost is equal to the tax, it will have the 
indirect effect of drawing in VRE generators if they are the most cost- 
effective low-emission generators available in the system. 
We show how the market value of variable renewables, and indeed 
any type of generator regardless of its variability, is contingent on the 
mechanism (policy instrument) by which it enters the long-term 
equilibrium solution. We also discuss how the previous literature on the 
subject has failed to highlight this fact, either by an implicit assumption 
on the policy instrument (Mills and Wiser, 2015; Kopp et al., 2012; Mills 
and Wiser, 2013; Hirth, 2013; Gilmore et al., 2015; Winkler et al., 2016; 
Gowrisankaran et al., 2016), by simultaneously changing several con-
founding factors (Hirth, 2013; Winkler et al., 2016) or by ignoring 
market value altogether (Frew et al., 2016; Schlachtberger et al., 2017; 
Reichenberg et al., 2018). 
First we consider the economic theory (Sections 2 and 3) and then 
demonstrate the effects in a reimplementation of the energy system 
model EMMA used in (Hirth, 2013) in the PyPSA modelling framework 
(Brown et al., 2017) (Sections 4 and 5). 
2. Introduction to theory 
2.1. Zero-profit rule, market value and LCOE without policy measures 
In a long-term equilibrium, where generator capacity is optimised 
along with power system operation, producers make zero profit under 
idealised conditions of perfect market competition, free entry and exit, 
linear cost functions and without any further constraints (Boiteux, 1949; 
Boiteux, 1960). If any producer makes a net profit, new producers will 
enter the market and competition will drive profits to zero; similarly if 
producers make a net loss, some will exit the market until losses are 
eliminated. For electricity markets, this zero-profit condition means in a 
long-term equilibrium that the average revenue that generators receive 
from the market exactly covers their costs. 
The zero-profit condition can be restated per unit of generated en-
ergy in terms of the market value MVs and levelised cost of electricity 
LCOEs of each generator s: 
MVs = LCOEs (1) 
The market value is defined as the revenue averaged over each unit 
of energy sold. The LCOE is defined as the net present sum of all in-
vestment, fuel, operational and maintenance costs averaged over each 
unit of energy that is actually generated. While this definition of LCOE 
agrees with the usual definition for dispatchable generators, we differ 
from the standard definition for wind and solar by only averaging over 
the actual energy generated, rather than what theoretically would be 
available before curtailment. This definition raises the LCOE of wind and 
solar when there is curtailment at high penetrations. The equality (1) is 
proved for a general long-term equilibrium power model in Section 3.1. 
Different generators have different market values because they 
occupy different niches in the optimal system, depending on their 
characteristics such as cost and variability. Each technology has its own 
optimal share of generation in the long-term equilibrium. To change that 
share, policy intervention is required. In this contribution we consider 
both support policies that force particular technologies into the system, 
as well as policies that force out polluting technologies. 
2.2. Technology-specific support policies 
Under ‘support policy’ we group all policies that encourage invest-
ment in a particular technology beyond the pure cost-optimum, either 
by mandating a certain share in the generation mix, or by creating a 
revenue stream independent of the electricity market. Examples of such 
policies include Renewable Energy Portfolio Standards (RPS) in various 
US states and Feed-in Tariffs (FiT) in Germany, which give a remuner-
ation for every unit of energy generated from wind and solar. 
The fact that an additional subsidy is required to achieve a higher 
share implies that the generator cannot make sufficient revenue from the 
market to cover its costs. The subsidy required to cover costs can be 
translated into an equivalent Feed-in Premium (FiP) μs > 0 paid per unit 
of generated energy, thus modifying the zero-profit condition at equi-
librium to 
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MVs = LCOEs − μs (2) 
The FiP tops up the average revenue received by the generator from 
the market to the LCOE so that the generator covers its costs. 
This relation holds regardless of the technology or support policy. If a 
technology is forced to cover a fixed share of demand, we show in 
Section 3.3 that μs is the shadow price of the corresponding constraint. If 
the share of generation available before curtailment is fixed instead of 
the actual generation (Hirth, 2013; Pahle et al., 2015), μs is proportional 
to the shadow price of the constraint (see Appendix B.1). If generators do 
not participate in the market at all, but are paid a Feed-in Tariff (FiT) to 
cover their costs at the same level as the LCOE, then μs is the difference 
between the average market value and the tariff. 
Without a support policy, the system would settle into the equilib-
rium described in Section 2.1 with MV equal to LCOE for all technolo-
gies. A higher share of technology s requires a policy intervention. The 
higher the share, the higher the equivalent FiP μs needs to be, and thus 
the lower the market value drops according to Eq. (2). 
The decline in market value is an indirect effect of the decline of 
market prices during the hours that the supported technology is gener-
ating. The exact mechanism is explained in more detail in the next 
section, but essentially the FiP μs paid per MWh reduces the effective 
marginal cost of technology s by μs, since it gets a revenue of μs from 
outside the market. The combined effect of having a larger share of 
technology s as well as technology s bidding into the market at a lower 
price serves to lower market prices when s is generating. This well- 
known fact that prices are surpressed by a surplus of some good is the 
essential result observed in the literature on the market value of re-
newables (Mills and Wiser, 2015; Kopp et al., 2012; Mills and Wiser, 
2013; Hirth, 2013; Gilmore et al., 2015; Winkler et al., 2016; Gow-
risankaran et al., 2016; Borenstein, 2008). Yet, these studies do not draw 
the conclusion that the MV decline is due to the surplus of VRE, but 
instead explain it by the variable nature of these sources. 
The MV decline does not contradict the zero-profit condition, since 
the condition only applies to an undistorted equilibrium. We have 
departed from the equilibrium solution by forcing a share of a tech-
nology. The other technologies are still freely optimised, and are thus 
still subject to the zero-profit rule, although their share of total gener-
ation will be lower. 
2.3. CO2 policies 
CO2 policies include direct CO2 taxes and CO2 caps with traded 
certificates. They indirectly support wind, solar and other low-emission 
technologies by penalising high-emission generators. 
Under CO2 policies, the zero-profit rule still holds, but the relation-
ship between revenue and costs now includes the equivalent CO2 tax 
μCO2 (in euro per tonne of CO2, €tCO2
− 1) and the technology-specific 
emission factor es (in tCO2MWh− 1) 
MVs = LCOEs + esμCO2 (3) 
This relation is proven in Section 3.4. 
For technologies like wind, solar or nuclear with no direct emissions, 
we have exact cost recovery MVs = LCOEs. CO2-emitting generators have 
to cover both generation costs and the CO2 tax with their market reve-
nue at equilibrium, and are thus pressured out of the market to the 
benefit of low-CO2 generation. 
CO2 policies raise the market values of CO2-emitting generation by 
raising their marginal costs, and thus raising prices at hours when they 
are generating. 
2.4. Comparison of support and CO2 policies 
The effects of the two types of policy on prices and market values are 
strikingly different. Support policies depress market prices when the 
supported generators are running and offer them compensation outside 
of the market, whereas CO2 policies raise market prices when fossil- 
fuelled generators are running, thus encouraging low-emission genera-
tors into the market. Support policies increase the share of low-emission 
technologies but reduce their average market revenue, whereas CO2 
policies increase their share while leaving their zero-profit condition 
intact. For fossil-fuelled generators, low-carbon support policies reduce 
their share of the market but do not affect their zero-profit condition, 
while CO2 policies increase the overall costs they need to cover from the 
market, thus also reducing their share. 
Fig. 1 provides an illustration of how the two policies impact 
dispatch, price and momentary revenue in a highly-simplified model 
with solar and three fossil technologies (lignite, hard coal and gas) over 
a period of 2 days (more elaborate simulations are provided in later 
sections). The solar support policy lowers prices both by the merit order 
effect when solar is feeding in and by turning prices negative when solar 
is price-setting (see the next section for a discussion of this mechanism; 
solar generation continues during this period because its feed-in is being 
subsidised outside of the market). Under the CO2 policy, prices go to 
zero when solar is price-setting, but this is more than compensated by 
the rise in prices when the fossil-fuelled generators are price-setting. 
These effects on prices affect the market value of solar. With no 
policy, there is sufficient revenue for solar to cover its costs. For the CO2 
policy this is also the case, since the area under the revenue curve is the 
same, but the hours when solar earns change: it earns less at midday, but 
more on the flanks of its generation profile. For the solar support policy, 
prices and revenue are lower at all times when it generates, so solar 
cannot cover its costs from the market. 
Additional flexibility options such as transmission, demand response 
and storage alter the background system by allowing price arbitrage to 
smooth the variability of renewable generators (Hirth, 2013; Hirth, 
2016; Tveten et al., 2016). By providing more demand in hours with low 
prices, flexibility helps to raise prices when renewables are abundant 
(Brown et al., 2019; Härtel and Korpås, 2021; Bernath et al., 2021; 
Böttger and Härtel, 2021; Ruhnau, 2020). When renewables are scarce 
and prices are high, flexibility lowers prices by providing more supply. 
More flexibility means that lower subsidies are required for VRE support 
policies to reach a given penetration level, while for CO2 policies a lower 
CO2 price is required for a given abatement level when flexibility is 
available. 
3. Theory 
In this section we use a long-term optimisation framework to show 
how prices and market values relate to costs and policy measures, and in 
particular under what circumstances the ‘zero profit’ rule holds. Proofs 
are provided for the equations stated in the previous section. The proof 
of the zero-profit condition with no additional policy measures goes 
back to Boiteux (1949); the discussion of profit under VRE support 
policies can also be found in Green and Léautier (2015). The optimisa-
tion problem setup and use of Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions in 
the present contribution follows the textbook by Biggar and Hesamza-
deh (2014). 
3.1. Long-term equilibrium without policy measures 
We maximise yearly social welfare for a single node with linear 

























gs,t = 0 ⊥ λt ∀t (5)  
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− gs,t ≤ 0 ⊥ μ s,t ∀s, t (6)  
gs,t − gs,tGs ≤ 0 ⊥ μs,t ∀s, t (7) 
Here t labels time periods representing a year of load and weather 
conditions, a labels consumers, s labels generators, da, t is the demand, gs, 
t is the generator dispatch, Gs is the generator capacity and gs,t ∈ [0, 1] is 
the availability/capacity factor (which varies with time for variable 
renewable generators like wind and solar). λt is the marginal price of 
electricity, while μs,t and s, t represent shadow prices of the generator 
constraints. cs represent the annualised investment and fixed operations 
and maintenance costs of the generators, while os represent variable 
costs. Ua, t(da, t) are the differentiable, concave utility functions of the 
consumers. 
The KKT conditions are first-order conditions that are necessary for 
the optimal solution to satisfy. (Since in our case the objective function is 
concave and the constraints are affine, the conditions are also sufficient 
for optimality). The definition of the Lagrangian L and KKT conditions 
are provided in Appendix A. Conventions are chosen such that λt is 
positive if the price-setting generator has positive marginal costs, and 
such that all shadow prices μ are positive or zero. 
From KKT stationarity we have for the variables representing the 
generator dispatch gs, t and capacity Gs: 
∂L
∂gs,t
= 0⇒ − os + λt + μ s,t − μs,t = 0 (8)  
∂L
∂Gs
= 0⇒ − cs +
∑
t
gs,tμs,t = 0 (9)  









= 0 (11) 
We will now show that each generator s exactly makes back their 
costs csGs +
∑
tosgs, t from their market revenue 
∑
tλtgs, t, i.e. the ‘zero- 
profit condition’. 
Fig. 1. Comparison of dispatch, market price and momentary solar revenue per unit of capacity in a highly-simplified long-term equilibrium model over 2 days with 
only four technologies (lignite, coal, gas and solar) and (a) no policy, (b) solar support policy and (c) CO2 policy. The solar support and CO2 policies are tuned to give 
the same penetration of solar. 
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The first step substitutes the equations from KKT stationarity; in the 
second step terms are reorganised; in the final step the equations from 
KKT complementary slackness are applied. 
We can use this, along with primal feasibility for the demand 
balancing constraint (5), to show that the total generator costs are equal 
















For a situation with perfectly price-inelastic demand where we can 
reduce the overall problem to generator cost minimisation, this is the 
statement of strong duality between the objectives of the primal and 
dual problems. Note, however, that unlike Eq. (13), Eq. (12) also holds 
at the level of individual generators. 
3.2. LCOE, MV and RMV without policy measures 
When both sides of (12) are divided by the generator’s total dispatch 
we recover on the left the definition of the levelised cost of energy 










and on the right the definition of the market value (MV) of the generator, 
sometimes called the absolute market value (Hirth, 2013), which gives 









The equality (12) then gives us: 
LCOEs = MVs ∀s (16) 
This is a restatement of the zero-profit rule on an averaged per-MWh 
basis. 
The relative market value (RMV), also called the value factor in 
(Hirth, 2013), is the ratio of the market value to the load-weighted 
































Using the zero-profit rule (12) and the energy balance constraint (5) 
































From this it can be seen that in the absence of other constraints, the 
RMV is the ratio of a technology’s share of total costs (first fraction) to its 
share of demand (second fraction). If a particular technology has a 
similar share of both energy provision and costs, then it will have an 
RMV close to unity. 
3.3. Long-term equilibrium with support policy 
If a subset of generators S is singled out and forced to provide a fixed 




gs,t ≥ Γ ⊥ μΓ (19) 
For example, for a particular penetration of wind, S would represent 
all wind generators and Γ would be a fixed fraction of the annual 
demand. 
For generators included in the constraint, s ∈ S, the stationarity Eq. 
(8) for gs, t from the previous section is altered to 
∂L
∂gs,t
= 0⇒ − os + λt + μ s,t − μs,t + μΓ = 0 (20)  







gs,t(λt + μΓ) ∀s ∈ S (21) 
For generators excluded from the constraint, s ∕∈ S, the zero-profit 
rule remains exactly the same as (12). 
If (19) is not binding, then μΓ = 0 and the zero-profit rule is recov-
ered. In this case the given share is already part of the unconstrained 
optimum. However if (19) is binding, then more generation from S is 
being forced into the solution than the optimum without constraint (19), 
therefore μΓ > 0 and generators in S can no longer recover their costs 
from the market prices λt alone. μΓ represents the per-MWh subsidy, or 
Feed-in Premium (FiP), required beyond the market price for generators 
in S to recover their costs. 
Dividing by the total generation 
∑
tgs, t we find for s ∈ S 
LCOEs = MVs + μΓ ∀s ∈ S (22) 
For s ∕∈ S we have the regular no-profit rule 
LCOEs = MVs ∀s ∕∈ S (23) 
Expressed another way: forcing in the penetration of a particular 
technology above its unconstrained optimal share depresses the market 
prices λt at the times when it is generating. This accounts for the ‘market 
value’ effect in long-term equilibrium models observed in (Hirth, 2013). 
The prices found here can be reproduced by taking the optimal value 
of μΓ, removing the constraint (19) and making the substitution os → os 
− μΓ for s ∈ S to get a new, lower effective marginal cost, i.e. moving μΓgs, 
t to the left-hand side of (21) (see proof in Appendix B.6). The support 
policy thus depresses market prices by two mechanisms: when tech-
nology s is generating, the larger share of technology s pushes down 
prices even when technology s is not price-setting by pushing the supply 
curve to the right (the merit order effect); when technology s is price- 
setting, the subsidy reduces the bid os by μΓ and can even turn the 
market price negative if μΓ is larger than the marginal cost os. Negative 
bids are rational for generators if they are guaranteed the subsidy even 
when prices are negative. In reality, some markets suspend support for 
subsidised generators bidding in the market once market prices turn 
negative for a sufficient time (4 hours in the case of renewable energy in 
Germany built from 2021 (Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz 2021, 2021)), 
thereby removing the incentive for them to bid negative prices and thus 
mitigating this effect. In this case, examined in Appendix E.2, support 
policies still depress prices by the merit order effect. 
3.4. Long-term equilibrium with CO2 policy 
If, rather than supporting particular technologies, we replace 
constraint (19) with a CO2 cap K, the behaviour is different. Consider the 
CO2 constraint: 
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esgs,t ≤ K ⊥ μCO2 (24)  
where es is the emission factor in tonne-CO2 per MWhel for generator s 
and K is a cap on yearly emissions in tonne-CO2 per year. This constraint 
has the same form as (19), except for the direction of the inequality sign 
and the weighting of generation. 
The stationarity Eq. (8) is altered to 
∂L
∂gs,t








gs,t(λt − esμCO2 ) ∀s (26) 
If the constraint (24) is binding, it pushes up market prices beyond 
the cost-recovery point so that charges for CO2 emissions are also 
covered from the market. 
Dividing by the total generation 
∑
tgs, t we find 
LCOEs = MVs − esμCO2 ∀s ∈ S (27) 
In this case, generators with no direct emissions, es = 0, continue to 
satisfy the zero-profit rule. Emitting generators with es > 0 have to cover 
the CO2 price with their market revenues, but still recover their costs 
once the CO2 levy has been paid. 
The same prices can be obtained by replacing the CO2 constraint with 
a direct cost of CO2 and making the substitution os → os + esμCO2, i.e. 
moving the term esμCO2gs, t to the left-hand side of (26). Through the 
higher effective operating costs for CO2-emitting generators, the CO2 
price increases market prices when these generators are setting the 
price. 
3.5. Other setups 
Hybrid setups that combine CO2 pricing and technology support are 
of course possible, and can be found in many of today’s markets in 
Europe. A moderate CO2 price tilts the equilibrium in favour of low- 
carbon technologies and reduces the feed-in premium needed for a 
given share of variable renewable energy, thus raising the market value. 
For a given penetration of wind and solar, a hybrid approach allows the 
market value of VRE to be set at any value between the two extremes of 
low MV with a support policy only, and MV equal to LCOE for the case 
that only a CO2 policy is used to induce the share of VRE. Combining CO2 
pricing and technology support can reduce market distortions while 
limiting investor risk and thus their financing costs, as discussed in 
Section 6.2. 
More complicated setups (forcing fixed shares for available rather 
than dispatched energy, limited installation potentials, multi-node net-
works, storage, convex generation costs) do not alter the conclusions 
reached for the simpler model above. Proofs for these setups can be 
found in Appendix B. 
In addition, we show in Appendix B.7 that subsidising a set of 
technologies is exactly equivalent to taxing all other technologies when 
demand is perfectly price-inelastic. Switching from subsidy to tax just 
results in a constant lift to all the prices, and therefore a constant lift to 
all market values. Since a tax on non-VRE technologies is not a realistic 
policy proposal, we focus in the main text on CO2 policies. 
4. Power system model description 
The theoretical insights developed above are demonstrated in a 
market model based on EMMA (Hirth, 2013) that has been reimple-
mented in the open PyPSA framework (Brown et al., 2017). The code for 
the model is available online under an open licence (Brown, 2020). 
The model has five nodes for Germany and four of its neighbours: 
Poland, France, the Netherlands and Belgium. The model minimises 
long-term generation costs over historical hourly load and weather from 
the year 2010, assuming a perfectly price-inelastic demand up until a 
high value of lost load (1000 €/MWh). The model completely rebuilds 
the existing generation system (‘greenfield investment’) except for 
pumped hydro storage, for which existing capacities are taken assuming 
an energy storage capacity of 8 h at nominal power. 
Generators are aggregated into a single representative class for each 
technology following (Hirth, 2013). The available variable renewable 
technologies are wind and solar power, while the dispatchable genera-
tors are coal, lignite, lignite with CCS, nuclear, open cycle gas turbines 
(OCGT) and combined cycle gas turbines (CCGT). We keep most of 
EMMA’s cost and other technical assumptions, but update the nuclear 
cost from 4000 €/kW to 6000 €/kW, reflecting recent experience in 
Europe (Schröder et al., 2013), as well as reducing the wind cost from 
1300 €/kW to 1040 €/kW and the solar cost from 2000 €/kW to 510 
€/kW to reflect forecasts for 2030 made by the Danish Energy Agency in 
2019 (Technology Data for Generation of Electricity and District Heating, 
2019) (these assumptions are conservative given that some studies saw a 
cost of 460 €/kW for utility solar in Europe in 2019 (Vartiainen et al., 
2020); with our assumptions the LCOE of wind and solar are still above 
the average reverse auction results in Germany in 2019). A table of 
technology assumptions can be found in Appendix C. In order to 
concentrate on the interaction of market policy and market prices, the 
wind and solar costs are fixed for the simulations and no learning effects 
are applied for high penetrations of wind and solar that might reduce 
costs. In addition, we remove the options for new nuclear and CCS when 
we focus on the penetration of variable renewable energy under 
different policies, so that we can achieve the full range of penetrations 
for the comparison; for the same reason we remove the options for solar, 
wind and CCS when we focus on nuclear penetration under different 
policies. Without these removals, each technology would only rise to its 
particular share in the cost-optimal mix of low carbon technologies for a 
given CO2 policy; since this mix depends strongly on the model as-
sumptions, and has been well studied in the literature (Verbruggen, 
2008; Hamacher et al., 2013; Sepulveda et al., 2018; Kan et al., 2020), 
we avoid allowing the low-carbon technologies to compete in this study. 
The removal of the options for new nuclear and CCS for electricity 
generation can also be seen as representative of the policy environment 
in countries like Germany with regard to these technologies. 
Transmission capacities between countries are fixed at the net 
transfer capacities (NTC) values from summer 2010. Following (Hirth, 
2013) a discount rate of 7% is applied. To ensure that additional con-
straints do not distort the theoretical picture developed in the previous 
section, we do not model unit commitment or assume a baseload pre-
mium (whereby nuclear, coal and lignite run even if their variable cost is 
higher than the market price), nor do we model reserve requirements or 
revenue from reserve markets. To avoid interference with the CO2 policy 
we introduce here, we also remove the CO2 price of 20 €/tCO2 assumed 
as a default in (Hirth, 2013). 
In Appendix D we compare the results for the relative market value to 
the results from (Hirth, 2013), with and without the technology 
assumption changes. We find good agreement between the models. 
To explore the impact of flexibility, in some scenarios we also allow 
the expansion of the transmission grid and the installation of new stor-
age in the form of batteries and underground hydrogen storage (based 
on electrolysis of water and hydrogen turbines to feed back into the 
grid). 
5. Simulation results 
5.1. The market value of wind and solar depend on the policy measure 
We contrast two main cases, one where VRE generation is driven by a 
constraint on minimum penetration level (VRE support policy) and 
another case where VRE generation is driven indirectly by a cap on CO2 
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emissions (CO2 policy), which makes fossil-fuelled generation more 
costly and thus draws VRE generation into the cost-minimal solution. 
Technically, the VRE support policy is implemented by a constraint in 
the optimisation model (Eq. (19)) that mandates a certain share of the 
demand be fulfilled by wind and solar. The CO2 policy is implemented 
with a constraint on the maximum CO2 emissions, which corresponds to 
a tax on CO2-emitting generators (Eq. (24)). 
The resulting market value (MV) at penetration levels for wind and 
solar between 0 and 70% for these two cases are shown in Fig. 2. The 
results for the VRE support policy case confirm what is widely seen in 
the literature (Mills and Wiser, 2015; Kopp et al., 2012; Mills and Wiser, 
2013; Hirth, 2013; Gilmore et al., 2015; Winkler et al., 2016; Gow-
risankaran et al., 2016; Borenstein, 2008): MV declines with rising 
penetration, eventually dropping to zero at a VRE penetration of 50%. 
The CO2 policy shows a quite different trend: the MV dips slightly, then 
increases gently up to just over 80 €/MWh at 70% penetration. 
This shows clearly that market value behaves differently depending 
on the policy used to reach a given level of wind and solar generation. 
Now we expand upon the results for each policy in detail. 
5.2. Market value with VRE support policy 
Fig. 3 shows the behaviour of the MV, LCOE and Feed-in-Premium 
(FiP) μs1 for the VRE support policy. 
The LCOE remains approximately constant, dipping first and then 
rising gently. The dip occurs because of the changing mix of wind and 
solar, which have different LCOEs: first wind is preferred, which has a 
higher LCOE but a more regular profile, then solar increases, which has a 
lower LCOE, before wind takes over again at higher penetrations. The 
rise in LCOE reflects a preference for wind at higher penetrations, as well 
as curtailment which lowers the total generation in the denominator of 
the LCOE. 
The FiP has to make up the difference between the MV and LCOE, 
and thus rises accordingly. The FiP is always positive because the 
equilibrium solution without the VRE support policy does not contain 
wind and solar (since the cost of generation from fossil fuels is so low in 
the model). The MV can reach zero and even become negative, since the 
FiP can force market prices to be negative in some hours; simulations 
where negative prices are forbidden are presented in Appendix E.2. 
5.3. Market value with CO2 policy 
Fig. 4 shows the MV, LCOE and CO2 tax μCO2 for the CO2 policy.
2 
Since wind and solar have no direct CO2 emissions, by Eq. (3) the 
LCOE is exactly equal to the MV. The dip and gentle rise of LCOE has the 
same explanation as for the VRE support policy (see Appendix Fig. E.20 
for the changing shares of wind and solar). 
The CO2 price required to induce a given VRE penetration rises to 70 
€/tCO2 at a penetration of 50%, before rapidly rising to above 220 
€/tCO2 at 70%. 70 €/tCO2 is more than the 55 €/tCO2 peak seen in early 
2021 for CO2 certificate prices in the European Union Emissions Trading 
System (ETS), but is less than the 129 €/tCO2 price expected in 2030 in 
order to reach the targets of the European Green Deal (Pietzcker et al., 
2021), and considerably less than the 195 €/tCO2 damages due to 
climate change estimated in 2020 with a 1% rate of time preference by 
the German Environment Agency (Methodenkonvention 3.1 zur Ermittlung 
von Umweltkosten: Kostensätze, 2020). Until 50% penetration the 
behaviour of the system under a CO2 policy only requires moderate 
changes. Beyond 50%, the lack of additional flexibility options makes 
CO2 mitigation more expensive. 
5.4. System cost and market price 
Fig. 5 compares the rising average system generation cost for the two 
policies, including all capital and marginal costs but excluding subsidies 
and the CO2 price. The costs rise at a similar rate with VRE penetration, 
implying that both policies achieve similar effects. Costs are slightly 
Fig. 2. Comparison of the market value of wind and solar as their combined 
penetration is mandated using (i) a VRE support policy and (ii) a CO2 policy. 
Fig. 3. Market quantities under a VRE support policy as the penetration of 
wind and solar energy covering electricity demand is increased. In this case 
there is no additional flexibility from storage or transmission reinforcement. 
Fig. 4. Market quantities under a CO2 policy as the average CO2 emission 
factor is reduced, forcing up the wind and solar penetration. 
1 As outlined in Section 3.3, the Feed-in-Premium (FiP) μs is the dual, or 
shadow price, of the VRE constraint (19). 
2 As outlined in Section 3.4, the CO2 tax μCO2 is the dual, or shadow price, of 
the CO2 constraint (24). 
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higher with a CO2 policy because increasing wind and solar penetration 
is not the only cost-effective measure to reduce CO2 emissions: switching 
from lignite and coal to natural gas is prioritised before VRE capacity at 
some penetrations. These measures make the system more expensive 
than the VRE support policy case for a given VRE penetration. (If we 
compare the policies based on CO2 emissions, then the CO2 policy is 
naturally more efficient at reducing emissions, see Appendix Fig. E.26.) 
Fig. 5 also shows how the load-weighted average electricity price 
changes with penetration for each policy. For the VRE support policy, 
prices are depressed by the merit order effect when VRE generate and by 
negative prices when VRE are price-setting, as discussed in Section 3.3. 
For the CO2 policy the merit order effect of VRE generation is counter- 
acted by the increasing cost of fossil-fuelled generation, pushing up 
prices when these generators are price-setting (see Section 3.4).3 
For the VRE support policy, consumers pay less than the generation 
cost, since the difference between the average market price and the 
generation cost is accounted for by the external subsidies paid to VRE 
generation. For the CO2 policy, consumers pay more than the generation 
cost, since they must also pay for CO2 emissions according to the pre-
vailing CO2 price. Both the costs of the VRE subsidies and the revenues 
from the CO2 tax can be passed on to consumers, so that consumers only 
pay the average system cost in the end, thereby evening out the differ-
ence between the policy regimes from the consumers’ perspective.4 
5.5. Including transmission and storage flexibility 
If additional flexibility options are made available to the investment 
optimisation, the market value under a CO2 policy remains regular all 
the way up to full VRE penetration. Flexibility in this case includes the 
option to build new transmission capacity between the countries, as well 
as the availability of both battery storage and hydrogen storage. The 
results for MV of VRE with and without flexibility are shown in Fig. 6. 
Without flexibility, the MV increases strongly above 70% because of 
high curtailment that depresses the LCOE. High curtailment reflects the 
mismatch between VRE and demand profiles. With flexibility, the MV 
rises slowly before plateauing at around 71 €/MWh. When VRE covers 
all of the demand and storage losses, the average total system cost is 
higher at 114 €/MWh, reflecting the cost of additional flexibility op-
tions, in this case primarily the hydrogen storage. The CO2 price rises 
from 55 €/tCO2 at 50% to 165 €/tCO2 at 100% penetration (less than the 
climate damages of 195 €/tCO2 estimated in 2020 with a 1% rate of time 
preference in (Methodenkonvention 3.1 zur Ermittlung von Umweltkosten: 
Kostensätze, 2020)). 
The breakdown of system cost by component in Fig. 7 shows the 
substitution of technologies as the CO2 limit is tightened. Hydrogen 
storage is critical for removing the final emissions from the system, since 
hydrogen stored underground can provide power when wind and solar 
feed-in is low for multiple days. The fact that wind and solar dominate 
system costs at the same time as dominating energy generation gua-
rantees a relative market value (RMV) close to unity according to Eq. 
(18). Even at full VRE penetration, the RMV of wind and solar only drops 
to 0.62, see Appendix Fig. E.25. Similar results have also been shown in 
models coupled to building heating and transport, where demand 
response from electric vehicles and heat pumps, as well as cheap storage 
of heat, hydrogen and methane, help to support prices using price 
arbitrage and keep the RMV close to unity (Brown et al., 2019; Härtel 
and Korpås, 2021; Bernath et al., 2021; Böttger and Härtel, 2021; 
Ruhnau, 2020). Flexible demand and storage bid up prices by providing 
extra demand when VRE are abundant, and lower prices by reducing 
demand when VRE are scarce. 
It is sometimes assumed that prices become singular in a system 
based entirely on wind and solar, alternating between zero during VRE 
abundance and very high levels during VRE scarcity. In Appendix E.6 we 
show that this is not the case by looking at the price duration curves in 
the system. As fossil-fuelled generation is pushed out of the system, 
Fig. 5. Comparison of average system generation cost (excluding CO2 price) 
and average market price for the VRE support and CO2 policies 
without flexibility. 
Fig. 6. Market value under VRE support and CO2 policies as wind and solar 
penetrations rise, for scenarios with and without additional flexibility from 
transmission and storage. The penetration of VRE as a fraction of demand goes 
beyond 100% to 117% because VRE must also cover storage losses. 
Fig. 7. Breakdown of average system cost (total cost divided by total load) 
under a CO2 policy as the CO2 budget is tightened, for a scenario with trans-
mission expansion as well as short- and long-term storage. The average system 
cost, including the CO2 price, is equal to the load-weighted average market 
price by Eq. (13). 
3 If the CO2 policy is replaced by a tax on non-VRE generation, the system 
costs will be identical and the market prices are lifted by a constant factor, as 
discussed in Appendix B.7. In this case the effect of the CO2 policy is similar 
because the non-VRE generators all emit CO2, albeit at different rates.  
4 This is only true for the model setup of perfectly price-inelastic demand; the 
difference would be more significant with elastic demand. 
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storage and transmission arbitrage start to set the prices, removing 
singular prices with demand bids when VRE is abundant and supply bids 
when VRE is scarce. The distribution of hours per year in which wind 
and solar recoup their costs barely changes as the CO2 budget is lowered. 
5.6. Support versus CO2 policies for nuclear power 
While we have focused on wind and solar generation, reflecting the 
focus of the literature on market value, exactly the same considerations 
apply in the case of non-variable low-emissions technologies like 
nuclear. 
Fig. 8 shows the behaviour of nuclear’s market value under a nuclear 
support policy and under a CO2 policy. As described in Section 4, we 
have removed the options to build wind, solar and CCS so that we can 
focus on nuclear penetration versus fossil-fuelled generation. It is 
assumed that nuclear can be built to operate flexibly (Jenkins et al., 
2018). 
With a technology-specific support policy pushing a fixed share of 
nuclear power, the market value of 34 €/MWh at low penetrations is 
much lower than the LCOE of 74 €/MWh, implying that it requires a 
subsidy of 40 €/MWh to compete with the other baseload power source 
in the system, lignite. The support policy has pushed nuclear’s market 
value below the point of cost recovery, causing it to cannibalise its own 
revenue. At higher penetrations the market value drops all the way to 
zero, since the cost characteristics of nuclear are not suitable to match 
the full variability of the demand. For nuclear it is the variability of 
demand, rather than of supply in the case of VRE, that combines with the 
support policy to push the market value to zero due to the mismatch of 
the supply and demand profiles. 
With a CO2 policy drawing nuclear into the system, the market value 
matches the LCOE, so that nuclear exactly makes back its costs from the 
market. The LCOE rises at higher penetrations as the capacity factor of 
nuclear drops to match the variable demand. Initially a CO2 price of 34 
€/tCO2 is necessary for nuclear to displace lignite and reach a share of 
68% of electricity generation. To reach 90% penetration, the CO2 price 
must rise to 69 €/tCO2, and even higher for higher penetrations (see 
Appendix Fig. E.24). 
Both the cannibalisation effects and the drop in market value with 
penetration under a support policy, as well as the fundamentally 
different behaviour under support versus CO2 policy regimes, follow the 
same pattern as the case of VRE technologies (compare Figs. 6 and 8). 
This was to be expected, given that the theoretical considerations in 
previous sections are technology-neutral. The decline of market value 
under a support policy happens for all technologies regardless of their 
variability or other techno-economic characteristics, and is thus pri-
marily a policy-dependent phenomenon. The only difference between 
dispatchable and variable technologies is that this decline happens faster 
for VRE because they do not match the shape of the variable demand as 
well as dispatchable technologies, making the impact of variability on 
market value only a secondary effect to policy, since it affects the rate of 
change rather than the direction. 
6. Discussion 
6.1. The mechanisms underlying MV decline 
This paper contrasts the impact of support and CO2 policies on the 
market value (MV) of wind and solar. We find that the MV of wind and 
solar decreases strongly under VRE support policies, whereas under CO2 
policies the MV remains high enough for wind and solar to cover their 
costs from the market. Thus, the declining MV of VRE that has been 
observed in previous literature (Mills and Wiser, 2015; Kopp et al., 2012; 
Hirth, 2013; Winkler et al., 2016; Hirth and Radebach, 2016; Blazquez 
et al., 2018) is caused primarily by the implicit assumption of policy 
regime, and not, as has been claimed before (Hirth, 2013; Blazquez 
et al., 2018), by the variability of wind and solar, although the vari-
ability can contribute towards the speed of decline. 
Many of the papers on market value in long-term equilibrium models 
achieve rising shares of wind and solar either by exogenously fixing the 
capacity of wind and solar (Mills and Wiser, 2015; Kopp et al., 2012; 
Mills and Wiser, 2013; Gilmore et al., 2015; Gowrisankaran et al., 2016; 
Borenstein, 2008) or by forcing them into the system with a constraint 
(Hirth, 2013; Winkler et al., 2016; Hirth, 2015; Pahle et al., 2015; Hirth, 
2016; Hirth and Müller, 2016),5 without always making clear that 
forcing a share of wind and solar is equivalent to a VRE support policy. 
For example, Hirth (2013) claims to ‘identify and quantify the impact of 
prices and policies on the market value of VRE’, but the policies do not 
include FiTs or renewable portfolio standards. Such policies are, how-
ever, implicit in the study design since it increases the penetration level 
beyond the equilibrium share, which would never come about without 
technology-specific policies.6 Therefore, their conclusions that ‘the 
market value of both wind and solar power is significantly reduced by 
increasing the market shares of the respective technology’ is not uni-
versally true, but only under the assumption that the market shares are 
increased using a technology-specific support mechanism. The paper by 
Winkler et al. (2016) has a similar set-up, where the increase in pene-
tration level, i.e. the implicit technology support policy, is part of the 
study design, yet not recognised as a policy. 
Much of the literature has viewed a CO2 price as only one among 
many other mechanisms by which the MV decline can be mitigated 
under a VRE support policy regime (Kopp et al., 2012; Mills and Wiser, 
2013; Hirth, 2013; Gilmore et al., 2015; Winkler et al., 2016; Gow-
risankaran et al., 2016; Hirth, 2015; Zipp, 2017). Since these papers 
leave the CO2 price fixed, they still observe a declining market value as 
the subsidy for VRE is increased, even with a high CO2 price of 100 
€/tCO2 and the removal of nuclear and CCS (Hirth, 2013; Hirth, 2015). 
In contrast, we replace the subsidy with a rising CO2 price as the primary 
mechanism to draw in wind and solar, thus guaranteeing that there is no 
decline in market value at all. 
A policy regime of subsidy for a particular technology will drive 
down its market value regardless of its variability, location, fuel cost or 
the rest of the generation mix. Studies that demonstrate declining 
market value are simply reproducing this basic point, except that they 
Fig. 8. Comparison of the market value of nuclear as its penetration is 
mandated using (i) a nuclear support policy and (ii) a CO2 policy. 
5 Note that Lamont (Lamont, 2008) does not follow this approach, but draws 
in wind and solar by reducing their capital costs, thereby simulating the effects 
of technological learning and guaranteeing that costs are covered from the 
market.  
6 Consider what would happen in the long-term equilibrium without any 
policy intervention: there would be no market value decline, since the tech-
nology would settle at its optimal long-term share with MV = LCOE, a share 
based on its variability, costs and the rest of the generation mix. It takes policy 
to distort this equilibrium, thereby altering the share and the market values. 
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obscure the nature of the subsidy by including it only implicitly as a 
constraint that forces in the technology share. Our contribution is to 
explain the mechanism by which this constraint acts as a subsidy to 
depress prices, showing it both in theory and in simulations. In addition, 
we also show that there is nothing particular about variable generators 
with respect to market decline with increased forced share. This also 
happens to nuclear, see Fig. 8. It is the fact that a technology is forced 
beyond its equilibrium share that causes the decline: the particular 
techno-economic properties of the technology (variability, ratio of 
CAPEX to OPEX) and the rest of the mix (the other available technolo-
gies and their properties) only affect the speed of decline. A CO2 policy 
that draws in wind and solar with a rising CO2 tax causes no decline, see 
Fig. 4. This is true for wind, solar and other low-CO2 technologies like 
nuclear, see Fig. 8.7 The variability is only a secondary characteristic 
that affects the rate of decline of MV under support policies, which is 
faster for VRE than for nuclear. We thereby demonstrate that the policy 
mix is the primary mechanism affecting market value (since it affects the 
fundamental direction of market value change), while variability, fuel 
cost and generation mix only affect the rate of change of market value in 
the policy regime. 
We grant a whole host of strategies, which can be collectively 
labelled ‘flexibility measures’,8 as having the potential to dampen the 
MV decline under a VRE support policy, yet not solving the bigger issue 
of the ‘cannibalisation effect’ (Hogan, 2017), which applies as much for 
VRE as for nuclear if they are subsidised. 
6.2. Policy implications 
The main policy implication is that policy makers should not see 
market value decline under VRE support policies as an indication that 
variable renewable energy is hitting fundamental integration limits. 
Thus we oppose the notion expressed e.g. in Hirth and Radebach (2016), 
where they claim that: ‘variable renewables face a substantial difficulty 
in becoming economical at high market shares. Without fundamental 
technological breakthroughs, a deep decarbonisation of power systems 
will be hard to achieve based on wind and solar power alone. Other 
supplementary low carbon technologies are likely to be needed.’ 
MV decline is a result of policy choices rather than an intrinsic 
property of VRE. In particular, it is a result of choosing not to value the 
low CO2 emissions of wind and solar inside the market, but to subsidise 
VRE outside of the market. The strong dependence of market value on 
the policy regime (and on the rest of the system composition) means that 
market value should be used with a keen awareness of its limitations. 
Just as the LCOE metric does not provide a complete picture of the cost 
performance of technologies (Mai et al., 2021), market value should be 
used in concert with other metrics when comparing technologies, such 
as the effect on total system cost. 
This paper focuses on the effects of policy on market value rather 
than on the desirability of the policy measures themselves.9 While a CO2 
policy may be more efficient to reduce CO2 emissions in theory, there 
are many situations where VRE support policies are preferable to CO2 
policies, such as when encouraging research, development and 
deployment to lower costs through learning, reducing investor risk, or 
because in some regions subsidies enjoy more political support than 
taxes. In these cases the measure of successful integration should be the 
total cost of the system rather than market value, since the system cost 
can be calculated regardless of the market structure. Comparison to the 
economically efficient solution with a CO2 policy may also provide 
useful guidance.10 
In particular the impact on financial risk, and thus investor behav-
iour, may differ substantially between support and CO2 policies: CO2 
policies send a market signal to encourage low-emission generation, 
whereas one of the main purposes of support policies is to provide 
investor certainty for capital-intensive investments that might otherwise 
be subject to market risks from fluctuating electricity and CO2 prices 
(Hiroux and Saguan, 2010; Held et al., 2019). Lower risk means lower 
financing costs, which feeds through to a lower LCOE and a lower system 
cost (Schmidt et al., 2019; Egli et al., 2019; Butler and Neuhoff, 2008). A 
hybrid policy framework can provide both of these benefits: a CO2 price 
to support low-emission generation, and a guaranteed per-kWh feed-in 
premium for VRE generation. If the CO2 price is sufficiently high, then 
the feed-in premium for a given share of VRE, μΓ in Eq. (1), can be close 
to zero. This provides minimal market distortion, costs consumers very 
little, but reduces investor risk and thus lowers financing costs. 
6.3. Negative prices 
Under the VRE support policy, electricity prices may become nega-
tive because it is rational for VRE generators to offer negative bids, since 
they are subsidised for their feed-in regardless of the market price. VRE 
generators have an effective bid of their running cost minus a feed-in 
premium equivalent to the shadow cost of the VRE-constraint, as dis-
cussed in Section 3.3.11 A similar construct was used and negative prices 
were observed in (Pahle et al., 2015; Green and Léautier, 2015). In 
setups where the available energy rather than the dispatched energy is 
constrained (Hirth, 2013) VRE support does not cause negative prices 
because the constraint is equivalent to subsidising the capacity rather 
than the energy generation, see Appendix B.1. 
In reality, some countries have policies that withdraw subsidies 
when prices go negative for a sufficient time (4 hours in the case of 
Germany for generators built from 2021 (Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz 
2021, 2021)). Under such policy regimes, it would be rational for the 
producer never to bid in less than its running costs to the market, and 
thus the market prices would be higher. Results for support policies 
where negative prices are forbidden are provided in Appendix E.2. 
Under the VRE support policy the market values still decline well below 
the cost recovery point with increasing VRE penetration, but do so more 
slowly and do not turn negative. 
6.4. MV under different policies in reality: the example of Germany 
It is undisputed that the revenues from sales on the market for VRE 
generators have decreased in the real world, which has been shown in 
several studies on historical data for electricity prices (Sensfuß, 2007; 
Sensfuß et al., 2008; Hildmann et al., 2015; Figueiredo and da Silva, 
2018; Ozdemir et al., 2017; Hirth, 2018; López Prol et al., 2020; Mills 
and Wiser, 2015; Hirth, 2013). While this is partly due to short-term 
effects as the rest of the system takes time to reach a new equilibrium 
with VRE, it also reflects policy choices. In Germany, subsidies were 
used to increase the share of VRE in electricity to around 26% in 2018. 
The average power price and market values of wind and solar fell from 
2011 to 2016, as can be seen in Fig. 9. This is an effect of the FiT policy 
7 Remember from Section 4 that in the CO2 policy simulations, other low- 
carbon technologies were removed to achieve the full range of penetrations. 
With competing technologies, cost-recovery from the market under a CO2 
policy still applies for a mix of technologies following the theory in Section 3.  
8 These have been individually investigated in previous literature and may be 
DSM measures (Winkler et al., 2016; Pahle et al., 2015), storage (Hirth, 2013), 
hydro power (Hirth, 2016; Tveten et al., 2016; Obersteiner and Saguan, 2010) 
or transmission extensions (Hirth, 2013; Obersteiner and Saguan, 2010).  
9 For such an investigation, more sophisticated methods, which account for a 
broader technology selection, demand elasticity, inter-temporal dynamics, 
learning effects, path dependencies (Grubb et al., 2021), risk averse agents and 
political economy aspects would be necessary. 
10 In the model setup in this paper the system costs for each policy for a given 
level of CO2 emissions are quite close, see Appendix Fig. E.26.  
11 Note that this cause of negative prices is distinct from other causes, such as 
unit commitment or network constraints. 
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regime (which is a VRE support policy) combined with falling fuel pri-
ces. However, from 2016 onwards, prices increase again, with market 
values approaching current German LCOEs for wind and solar. This has 
been attributed to an increasing CO2 price on the EU Emissions Trading 
System (ETS) market (a CO2 policy) (Die Energiewende im Stromsektor: 
Stand der Dinge 2018, 2019). Thus the German prices (Fig. 9) may be 
interpreted as a supporting argument for our evaluation of the effect 
when VRE support policies dominate (up until 2016) and when CO2 
policies have a strong effect (after 2016). 
6.5. Limitations of this study 
In this study we have focused on the mechanisms connecting cost, 
price and policy in the long-term. The theory holds regardless of any 
specific technology assumptions, but many of the simulation results 
depend on the background system choices we have made. The base 
model excludes new nuclear, CCS, price-elastic demand, demand-side 
management (DSM), coupling to transport or heating, hydroelectric 
dams and interconnection across the whole of Europe. A larger 
geographic scope or the inclusion of hydroelectric dams, DSM or sector 
coupling would expand the flexibility mechanisms and thereby dampen 
the decrease of MV under VRE support policies and decrease system cost 
(Brown et al., 2018b; Brown et al., 2019). New nuclear or CCS could 
compete with VRE under a CO2 policy and limit the ultimate VRE 
penetration, depending on the costs, but they would not affect the 
conclusions on market value. The approach of grouping generators into 
representative classes for each technology, which we took over from 
(Hirth, 2013), is standard practice in long-term equilibrium modelling 
but leads to a strongly simplified step-wise merit order curve compared 
to the smoother curve that would arise from a wide variety of generator 
types. This does not affect our theoretical results for the long-term 
equilibrium, but may impact the rate of market value decline in a 
more realistic short-term model. 
7. Conclusions 
The market value of wind and solar (VRE) depends strongly on the 
policies used to promote them. Previous studies have implicitly assumed 
that direct subsidies are used to force VRE penetration, which have the 
effect of depressing both their market value and overall market prices. If 
instead a CO2 price is used to draw in low-emission generation, market 
values of generators in long-term equilibria are guaranteed to cover the 
generators’ costs. Market values remain stable even at VRE penetrations 
approaching 100%, as long as sufficient flexibility from transmission 
and storage is available in the system. 
This means that declining market value under support policies, such 
as Feed-in-Tariffs or Renewable Portfolio Standards, does not neces-
sarily indicate problems with the market integration of VRE. Declining 
market value is a side-effect of choosing a technology support policy, 
rather than creating value in the market for technologies with low CO2 
emissions. A better measure of market integration is the total system 
cost, since it can be calculated regardless of the market structure. 
By showing the strong dependence of market value on policy choice, 
we have thus resolved the apparent contradiction between the literature 
showing market value decline with penetration under support policies, 
and the literature showing that high penetrations of VRE can be cost- 
effective under CO2 policies. 
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Appendix A. Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions 
In this section we set the signs and notation for the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions. 
We have an objective function over variables labelled by l: 
max
xl
f (xl) (A.1)  
subject to equality (i) and inequality (j) constraints: 
gi(xl) = 0 ⊥ λi (A.2)  
hj(xl) ≤ 0 ⊥ μj (A.3) 












Fig. 9. Market data from Germany, 2010–2018. As the CO2 price rose towards 
the end of the period, so have the average market price and market values of 
wind and solar. Data from (Open Power System Data, 2019). (For interpretation 
of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web 
version of this article.) 
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The KKT conditions are equations satisfied by xl, λi and μj at the optimum point. 




















then primal feasibility: 
gi(xl) = 0 (A.6)  
hj(xl) ≤ 0 (A.7)  
then dual feasibility: 
μj ≥ 0 (A.8)  
and finally complementary slackness: 
μjhj(xl) = 0 (A.9) 
(i.e. either μj = 0 or the inequality constraint is binding hj(xl) = 0). 
Appendix B. Further proofs 
B.1. Single node long-term equilibrium with VRE support policy for available power 
If we add a constraint for a subset S of generators based on the available power before curtailment, as is done in (Hirth, 2013), rather than the 




gs,tGs ≤ − Θ ⊥ μΘ (B.1)  
(gs,t is the hourly capacity factor for generator s at time t) then this alters the stationarity Eq. (9) for Gs to 
∂L
∂Gs






gs,tμΘ = 0 (B.2)  











If there is no curtailment, gs,tGs = gs,t and this becomes the same expression as (21). 
Since μΘ multiplies the capacity Gs, this can be interpreted as a subsidy for capacity. (In Section 3.3 we fixed the share of dispatched generation 
instead, so there it was a subsidy on dispatch.) This means the effective marginal cost is not affected and does not go negative. This makes sense 
because if capacity is subsidised, generators have no incentive to feed in when prices are negative. Instead, they curtail the available energy. 
Dividing (B.3) by the total generation 
∑
tgs, t we find for s ∈ S 








∀s ∈ S (B.4) 
For s ∕∈ S we have the regular no-profit rule 
LCOEs = MVs ∀s ∕∈ S (B.5)  
B.2. Single node long-term equilibrium with limited installation potentials 
If there are limits on installable potentials for generators 
Gs ≤ Gmaxs ⊥μmaxs (B.6)  






μs,t + μmaxs = 0 (B.7)  
and now 
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μmaxs Gs (B.8) 
We have effectively added to the capital cost cs a cost related to the scarcity of the potential for Gs, which drives up the cost. Because the resource is 
scarce, generators can claim extra revenue for this scarcity, i.e. because there is no alternative, there is extra profit to be obtained from the market. 
B.3. Single node long-term equilibrium with storage 
Suppose we add storage units r with discharging dispatch gr, tdis and power capacity Grdis, storing power gr, tsto and capacity Grsto, and state of charge gr, tene 
and energy capacity Grene. The efficiency from hour to hour is ηrene (for losses due to self-discharge), the storing efficiency is ηrsto and the dispatch 
efficiency is ηrdis. 






















where the symbol ∘ runs over {ene, sto,dis}. We assume no marginal costs for the dispatch. 












gstor,t = 0 ⊥ λt ∀t (B.9) 
The standard capacity constraints apply: 
− g∘r,t ≤ 0 ⊥ μ ∘r,t ∀r, t (B.10)  
g∘r,t − G
∘
r ≤ 0 ⊥ μ∘r,t ∀r, t (B.11) 
In addition we have the constraint for the consistency of the state of charge between hours according to how much was dispatched or stored: 
gener,t − ηener gener,t− 1 − ηstor gstor,t +
(
ηdisr
)− 1gdisr,t = 0 ⊥ λ
ene
r,t ∀r, t (B.12) 
We assume that the state of charge is cyclic gr,− 1ene = gr, T− 1ene . 
From KKT stationarity we get: 
∂L
∂G∘r
= 0⇒ − c∘r +
∑
t
μ∘r,t = 0 (B.13)  
∂L
∂gdisr,t





)− 1λener,t = 0 (B.14)  
∂L
∂gstor,t
= 0⇒ − λt + μ stor,t − μ
sto
r,t + ηstor λ
ene





− μener,t − λ
ene
r,t + ηener λ
ene
r,t+1 = 0 (B.16) 

































































The first equality is stationarity for Gr∘; the second is complimentarity for constraint (B.11); the third is stationarity for gr, t∘ and complimentarity for 
constraint (B.10); the fouth rearranges terms and shifts the cyclic sum over gr, tene; the final equality uses the state of charge constraint (B.12). 
The final results shows that the storage recovers its capital costs by arbitrage, charging while prices λt are low, and discharging while prices are 
high. 
The relation between market value and LCOE of generators in the system is not affected by the introduction of storage (although the optimal 
capacities may change). 
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B.4. Multi-node long-term equilibrium with network 
For multiple nodes the demand and generator variables gain an extra index for the node n to which they are attached, and a term is added to the 














Knℓfℓ,t ⊥ λn,t ∀n, t (B.19)  
where Knℓ is the incidence matrix for the network. This is Kirchhoff’s Current Law (KCL). 
There are additional constraints on the flows related to the line capacity 
fℓ,t − Fℓ ≤ 0 ⊥ μℓ,t ∀ℓ, t (B.20)  
− fℓ,t − Fℓ ≤ 0 ⊥ μ ℓ,t ∀ℓ, t (B.21)  
and to Kirchhoff’s Voltage Law (KVL): 
∑
ℓ
Cℓ,cxℓfℓ,t = 0 ⊥ λc,t ∀c, t (B.22)  
where c label an independent basis of closed cycles in the network defined by the cycle matrix Cℓ, c, and xℓ is the series reactance of the line. 


















μ ℓ,t = 0
(B.23)  










= 0 (B.25) 





μℓ,t + μ ℓ,t
)





μℓ,t − μ ℓ,t
)








The first term is the sum over flows fℓ, t multiplied by the price difference between the connect nodes 
∑
t, nλn, tKn, ℓ, i.e. the congestion revenue. The 
second term is a distortion that disappears if KVL is not enforced (i.e. in a transport model with only KCL, it would not appear). 




















λn,tdn,a,t (B.31)  
where we have used (B.19). 
B.5. Non-linear generator cost functions 
Suppose we have non-linear, convex functions for the cost of new capacity Cs(Gs) and operation Os(gs, t): 
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gs,t = 0 ⊥ λt ∀t (B.33)  
− gs,t ≤ 0 ⊥ μ s,t ∀s, t (B.34)  
gs,t − gs,tGs ≤ 0 ⊥ μs,t ∀s, t (B.35) 
















This becomes a statement about marginal profit, i.e. small additions of capacity or generation will not generate any profit or loss. 
Generators with convex cost functions with positive derivatives will make a profit since revenue will be higher than costs. For example, if Cs(Gs) =
csGsn for n > 1 and there are no operating costs, the revenue will be ncsGsn, n times higher than the cost. These generators may however be undercut by 
other generators in the market with different cost functions. 
The effects of support and CO2 policies on market value are unchanged. 
B.6. Equivalent problems without constraints 










subject to equality and inequality constraints: 
gi(xl, ym) = 0 ⊥ λi (B.38)  
hj(xl, ym) ≤ 0 ⊥ μj (B.39)  
∑
m
cmym ≤ K ⊥ μ (B.40)  
then we can prove that at the optimal point the solutions for the KKT variables λl, μj are identical to the following problem without the final constraint 










subject to equality (i) and inequality (j) constraints: 
gi(xl, ym) = 0 ⊥ λi (B.42)  
hj(xl, ym) ≤ 0 ⊥ μj (B.43) 
This holds as long as the maximisation problem is a concave function, the inequality constraints are continuously differentiable convex functions 
and the equality constraints are affine functions (i.e. as long as the KKT conditions are sufficient for optimality). 
The lifting of the constraint into the objective function is a standard Lagrangian relaxation. The proof of equivalence of the KKT variables follows 

















− cmμ (B.44) 
This is the same as the stationarity for the second problem, where in the second problem the term cmμ comes from the objective function rather than 
the constraint. If the final constraint (B.40) is not binding, then μ = 0 by complimentarity and the problems are also identical. QED. 
The values of xl, ym are not necessarily identical, but in the case of power system problems, they often are. Since the KKT multipliers for generator 
constraints μ s,t , μs,t are identical in both problems, then generators at their upper or lower limits in the first problem are also at their limits in the 
second problem. The only ambiguities occur for the dispatch of generators that are neither at their lower nor at their upper limits. Where there are 
multiple generators setting the price with the same linear marginal cost functions, there can be multiple solutions for the same set of KKT multipliers. 
This is related to the fact that the constant K has disappeared from the second problem. For example, if K is a carbon dioxide budget, then the 
corresponding carbon tax μ might not result in a unique generator dispatch if there are many generators with the same marginal costs once the tax is 
included. 
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B.7. Supporting one group of technologies is equivalent to taxing the others 
In this section it is shown that a support policy for technologies s ∈ S with FiP μΓ is exactly equivalent to a tax of μΓ on technologies outside this 
group s ∕∈ S when demand is perfectly price-inelastic. Switching from forcing in technologies s ∈ S to forcing out technologies s ∕∈ S results in the prices 
at each time being lifted by the same constant μΓ. As a result, each market value is also lifted by μΓ. 
If S represents VRE technologies, then subsidising VRE is equivalent to taxing non-VRE. For the case that all non-VRE technologies have the same 
emissions factor, taxing non-VRE is equivalent to a CO2 tax. This latter situation would be relevant for a market with VRE and a single type of gas 
generator. 
For the proof we follow the description of the support policy in Section 3.3, with the difference that we now assume that the demand is perfectly 
price-inelastic in the model, i.e. that the variables da, t are constants. 
If a subset of generators S is singled out and forced to meet at least a fraction γ ∈ [0,1] of the total demand 
∑
a, t,da, t, this is represented with the 
constraint from Eq. (19) 
∑
s∈S,t
gs,t ≥ Γ = γ
∑
a,t
da,t ⊥ μΓ (B.45) 
For generators included in the constraint, s ∈ S, stationarity is 
∂L
∂gs,t
= 0⇒λt = os − μ s,t + μs,t − μΓ (B.46)  
and for other generators s ∕∈ S we have as in Eq. (8) 
∂L
∂gs,t
= 0⇒λt = os − μ s,t + μs,t (B.47) 












da,t ⊥ μΓ (B.48) 
Since we subtracted (B.45), the direction of the inequality reverses. Now rearrange, remembering that we are in a lossless system with balanced 
demand 
∑
s, tgs, t =
∑
a, tda, t from (5): 
∑
s∕∈S,t
gs,t ≤ (1 − γ)
∑
a,t
da,t ⊥ μΓ (B.49) 
This will give exactly the same results as the previous problem, since the constraint is identical up to a sign and a constant factor added to both 
sides, except now we are restricting technologies not in S to be no more than a fraction (1 − γ) of the demand, and the prices λt are lifted by μΓ. 
To show the effect on prices, consider stationarity for s ∈ S: 
∂L
∂gs,t
= 0⇒λt = os − μ s,t + μs,t (B.50)  
and for s ∕∈ S: 
∂L
∂gs,t
= 0⇒λt = os − μ s,t + μs,t + μΓ (B.51) 
By comparing Eqs. (B.46) and (B.47) for the support policy for S to the equivalent Eqs. (B.50) and (B.51), you can see that a subsidy for S with FiP μΓ 
is equivalent to a tax on non-S of μΓ. Switching from the subsidy to the tax results in the lift of all prices by a constant factor λt ↦ λt + μΓ. 
From an ‘effective bid’ perspective, forcing in the share of S subtracts μΓ from S marginal cost bids, while forcing out the non-S share adds μΓ to the 
non-S bids, simply lifting all bids on the merit-order curve by μΓ. 















= MVs + μΓ (B.52)  
Appendix C. Technology assumptions 
The technology assumptions from the original model EMMA (Hirth, 2013) and our model PyPSA are compared in Table C.1. While nuclear and 
lignite with CCS are disabled in the main calculations, for the calculations in the Appendix with nuclear the costs from (Schröder et al., 2013) are 
applied, to reflect experience in recent projects. 
Power plant lifetimes are taken from (Hirth, 2013) (nuclear has a lifetime of 50 years, while other plants have 25 years). 
Battery assumptions are drawn from (Budischak et al., 2013), hydrogen (H2) electrolysis from (Schmidt et al., 2017) and underground H2 storage 
from (Steward et al., 2009). 
The costs of transmission expansion between the countries are derived following (Schlachtberger et al., 2017), assuming high voltage alternating 
current connections, that transmission covers the distance between the geographical mid-points of the countries with 25% extra length to account for 
non-direct routes, a 33% capacity buffer for N − 1 failures and reactive power flows, and a 40 year lifetime for the new transmission assets. 
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Table C.1 
Comparison of technology assumptions in the different models.  
Quantity Unit EMMA PyPSA 
wind cost €/kW 1300 1040 
solar cost €/kW 2000 510 
nuclear cost €/kW 4000 6000 
nuclear fuel cost €/MWhth 3 3 
lignite cost €/kW 2200 2200 
lignite fuel cost €/MWhth 3 3 
lignite+CCS cost €/kW 3500 n/a 
lignite+CCS fuel cost €/MWhth 3 n/a 
coal cost €/kW 1500 1500 
coal fuel cost €/MWhth 11.5 11.5 
CCGT cost €/kW 1000 1000 
CCGT fuel cost €/MWhth 25 25 
OCGT cost €/kW 600 600 
OCGT fuel cost €/MWhth 50 50 
load shedding cost €/MWhel 1000 1000 
battery inverter €/kW n/a 333 
battery storage €/kWh n/a 167 
H2 electrolysis €/kWel n/a 750 
H2 electrolysis efficiency % n/a 80 
H2 turbine €/kWel n/a 800 
H2 storage €/kWh n/a 0.5 
transmission expansion €/(MWkm) n/a 400  
Appendix D. Comparison of PyPSA to EMMA results for RMV 
In this section the results from (Hirth, 2013) for the long-term relative market values of solar and wind are compared to the results from the 
reimplementation in PyPSA. Fig. D.10 shows the relative market values in the PyPSA model with the same technology assumptions as (Hirth, 2013) 
and with a constraint on available renewable energy following (Hirth, 2013) (see Appendix B.1). Fig. D.11 shows the results with the wind and solar 
costs updated, the CO2 price set to zero, the removal of nuclear and CCS as options, and a constraint on dispatched renewable energy following Section 
3.3. Table D.2 compares the relative market values for different sampling points. 
First we compare the results from EMMA (column 1 in Table D.2 and Figs. 18 and 27 in (Hirth, 2013)) and the reimplementation in PyPSA (column 
2 in Table D.2 and Fig. D.10). While there is clear agreement in the overall shape and trajectory of the curves, in three of the four cases PyPSA 
underestimates the relative market values compared to EMMA, particularly for the case of solar at 15% penetration. There are several factors causing 
the disagreement between EMMA and PyPSA: EMMA has baseload incentives which alter prices; EMMA has incentives for flexible generators like 
OCGT that reduce their capital costs, encouraging higher marginal cost generators into the market and pushing up prices; for the denominator of the 
RMV, EMMA takes a simple price average over time, while PyPSA load-weights average prices over time (emphasising times of high load when prices 
are either higher (evening) or lower (midday solar peak)); and finally it appears the EMMA code uses a lifetime of 25 years for nuclear rather than the 
50 years applied here. The solar disagreement is also large because the slope of the curve here is steep, so any deviation is magnified. 
Next we compare the results from the reimplementation in PyPSA (column 2 in Table D.2 and Fig. D.10) and the version of PyPSA with updated 
assumptions (column 3 in Table D.2 and Fig. D.11). One of the main change in costs was a reduction in solar costs, and this is reflected in Figs. D.10 and 
D.11 by the fact that the case with both wind and solar now differs from the pure wind case, since solar is competitive. The reduction of the CO2 price 
from 20 €/tCO2 to zero helps to suppress prices. And finally the constraint on dispatched energy rather than available energy means that costs decrease 
faster and go to zero, since VRE subsidy can cause hours of negative prices. When we constrain available energy, VRE is curtailed at zero price, 
meaning that RMV flatlines at high penetrations as in Fig. D.10 (note that at high penetrations, a lot of the energy is curtailed).
Fig. D.10. The relative market value of wind and solar as the share of their available energy is changed in the model for the case without storage or transmission 
reinforcement using all costs from (Hirth, 2013). 
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Fig. D.11. The relative market value of wind and solar as the share of their dispatched energy is changed in the model for the case without storage or transmission 
reinforcement using our updated costs.  
Table D.2 
Comparison of relative market values in the different models.  
Model costs EMMA (Hirth, 2013) PyPSA (Hirth, 2013) PyPSA adjusted 
solar at 0% 0.9 0.74 0.54 
solar at 15% 0.58 0.41 0.21 
wind at 0% 1.1 1.02 1.1 
wind at 30% 0.64 0.53 0.36  
Appendix E. Additional results 
E.1. Support policies for wind, solar and nuclear separately 
Results for support policies applied separately to wind are shown in Fig. E.12, solar in Fig. E.13 and nuclear in Fig. E.14. 
The solar market value declines much faster than for wind, as has been seen in previous results in this paper and elsewhere in the literature. 
The effect of forced penetration on nuclear is similar. The equilibrium solution without the constraint does not contain nuclear, because the cost is 
too high; a non-zero subsidy is required to cover the difference between its average market value and the LCOE. Because it is available at all times, it 
achieves penetration of up to 75% before the market value declines, which corresponds to the minimum value of the load. Above this point, it reaches 
lower capacity factors, forcing the LCOE up and the market value down.
Fig. E.12. Market quantities as the penetration of wind energy covering electricity demand is increased. In this case there is no additional flexibility from storage or 
transmission reinforcement.  
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Fig. E.13. Market quantities as the penetration of solar energy covering electricity demand is increased. In this case there is no additional flexibility from storage or 
transmission reinforcement. 
Fig. E.14. Market quantities as the penetration of nuclear energy covering electricity demand is increased. In this case there is no additional flexibility from storage 
or transmission reinforcement. 
E.2. Support policies with no negative prices 
In this section we take the results from the support policy and forbid negative prices, by setting the price to zero whenever it goes below zero. The 
results for systems without additional flexibility are shown for wind and solar in Fig. E.15, for wind in Fig. E.16, for solar in Fig. E.17 and for nuclear in 
Fig. E.18. In all cases the average market price falls only gradually. The market values still decline well below the point of cost recovery, but the decline 
is gentler than when negative prices are allowed, and the market values never turn negative.
Fig. E.15. Market quantities for a VRE support policy for wind and solar with no negative prices and without additional flexibility.   
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Fig. E.16. Market quantities for a VRE support policy for wind with no negative prices and without additional flexibility.  
Fig. E.17. Market quantities for a VRE support policy for solar with no negative prices and without additional flexibility.  
Fig. E.18. Market quantities for a VRE support policy for nuclear with no negative prices and without additional flexibility.  
E.3. CO2 policy details 
In Fig. E.19 the effect of a CO2 constraint on average market prices, wind and solar MV (equal to LCOE), the CO2 dual price and the wind and solar 
penetrations are plotted. From the unconstrained equilibrium with emissions of around 1.2 tCO2/MWhel down to about 0.7 tCO2/MWhel, emissions 
are reduced by substituting coal for lignite, and gas for goal. Below 0.7 tCO2/MWhel, wind and solar penetrations rise steadily to replace natural gas. 
The CO2 price required to reach each target rises in steps as particular fuels are substituted, before rising very steeply below 0.3 tCO2/MWhel, where it 
gets harder to match the variable profiles of wind and solar with the load. 
The market price increases with a stricter CO2 constraint, since the rising CO2 price increases all effective marginal costs os → os + esμK. The market 
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values of wind and solar initially remain steady, since they are equal to the LCOE, which is stable. However, as penetration rises, curtailment increases 
and the LCOE drops. 
Fig. E.20 shows the corresponding figure as a function of the combined wind and solar penetration. 
The analysis was repeated with the addition of transmission expansion and storage investment possibilities for battery and hydrogen storage; the 
corresponding results are plotted in Fig. E.21 as a function of the CO2 limit and in Fig. E.22 as a function of penetration. With the additional flexibility, 
curtailment is limited and a VRE penetration of 100% without either the average market price (which reflects total system cost) or the market values 
rising drastically. 
In Figs. E.23 and E.24 the analysis is reproduced for a scenario where the CO2 limit is brought down with only nuclear as a low CO2 technology. 
Once the CO2 price reaches 34 €/tCO2, nuclear is competitive with lignite and rises to a share of 68% of electricity generation. To reach 90% 
penetration, the CO2 price must rise to 69 €/tCO2.
Fig. E.19. Market quantities as the average CO2 emission factor is reduced to zero for a scenario without additional flexibility.  
Fig. E.20. Market quantities as the average CO2 emission factor is reduced to zero for a scenario without additional flexibility.  
Fig. E.21. Market quantities as the average CO2 emission factor is reduced to zero for a scenario with transmission expansion as well as short- and long-term storage. 
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Fig. E.22. Market quantities as the average CO2 emission factor is reduced to zero for a scenario with transmission expansion as well as short- and long-term storage.  
Fig. E.23. Market quantities as the average CO2 emission factor is reduced to zero for a scenario with nuclear and no wind or solar.  
Fig. E.24. Market quantities as the average CO2 emission factor is reduced to zero for a scenario with nuclear and no wind or solar.  
E.4. Relative market value 
The relative market value (RMV), also called the value factor in (Hirth, 2013), is the ratio of the market value to the load-weighted average market 
price, see Eqs. (17) and (18). The absolute market values from Fig. 6 are shown as relative market values in Fig. E.25. Under a VRE support policy, the 
RMV still goes to zero and then negative. The RMV under a CO2 policy shows a shallow decline, which can be explained from Eq. (18). Eq. (18) shows 
that the RMV can also be expressed as the ratio between the technology’s fraction of system costs to its share of demand. Since at full penetration VRE 
covers all of the demand and storage losses, the RMV simply reflects the fraction of VRE in the total system costs. The RMV ends up at 0.62, reflecting 
the fraction of VRE in the system costs from Fig. 7 (remaining costs coming from transmission and storage for balancing). 
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Fig. E.25. Relative market values (RMV) for VRE support versus CO2 policies with and without flexibility.  
E.5. Comparing system cost as function CO2 emissions 
In Fig. 5 we compared the system costs under the VRE and CO2 policies as a function of the penetration of wind and solar without flexibility. In 
Fig. E.26 we provide the complementary figure comparing the system costs of the two policies as a function of average system CO2 intensity. For the 
system setup here, the policies provide similar results until higher penetrations, at which the CO2 policy is, unsurprisingly, more efficient at reducing 
CO2 emissions.
Fig. E.26. Comparison of system costs for VRE support and CO2 policies as a function of average system CO2 emissions, without flexibility.  
E.6. Price duration curves for a CO2 policy with flexibility 
In this section we discuss the price duration curves in the model as the CO2 budget is reduced to zero for the case of wind and solar in the presence 
of additional flexibility from storage and transmission reinforcement. 
Fig. E.27 shows the price duration curves for different levels of average system CO2 emissions. For higher emissions, the curve is flatter and there 
are no times of zero prices. As emissions reduce, there are more hours with zero prices set by wind and solar, rising to 16% of all hours, and more times 
with higher prices. When fossil generators are pushed out of the system, arbitrage between storage and transmission sets the non-zero prices, either by 
demand bids when VRE is abundant or supply bids when VRE is scarce. Note that the system does not degenerate into a singular system where prices 
are either zero or the value of lost load (1000 €/MWh in this case), as is sometimes assumed. Similar price duration curves were observed in a sector- 
coupled model in (Böttger and Härtel, 2021). 
The distribution of average revenue per capacity for wind and solar over the hours is largely unchanged, see the duration curves in Figs. E.28 and 
E.29. The number of hours where the generators make their money shows no concentration into a few hours as emissions reduce, but is spread evenly 
through the year in all cases. Note that this is not the same as the market value; the area under the curve is instead equal to the annualised costs of wind 
and solar. 
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Fig. E.27. Price duration curves for CO2 policies for different average system CO2 emissions, with flexibility from storage and transmission reinforcement.  
Fig. E.28. Average hourly per-capacity revenue duration curve for wind for different average system CO2 emissions, with flexibility from storage and transmission 
reinforcement. 
Fig. E.29. Average hourly per-capacity revenue duration curve for solar for different average system CO2 emissions, with flexibility from storage and transmission 
reinforcement. 
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